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Chapter 6
Nationhood and Muslims  
in Britain
nasar meer, varun uberoi,  
and tariq modood
These are difficult times to be British,” Andrew Gamble and Tony Wright maintain. Their assessment centers on how “the state which underpinned British identity is no longer the confident 
structure of earlier times.”1 They are not alone in coming to this view, 
and at least two implications follow from their observation.2 One is that 
the political unity of the administrative and bureaucratic components of 
the state is related to cultural features of British nationhood, including the 
ways in which people express feeling and being British. This is perhaps 
a familiar assessment of the configuration of all nation-states, though it 
could also imply that the state has been one—though not necessarily the 
most important—touchstone in the historical cultivation of British as a 
national identity.3
A number of contemporary political developments that put into ques-
tion the prevailing coherence of the British state—for example, devo-
lution, European integration, globalization—might add to the kinds 
of issues informing Gamble and Wright’s view, and are perhaps most 
starkly illustrated by the promised 2014 referendum on Scottish inde-
pendence. Of course, Britain has since its inception been a multinational 
state.4 It was constructed in a series of treaties and parliamentary acts 
between its constituent nations: England and Wales joining in 1536, 
Scotland in 1603 and 1707, Ireland in 1801 (formalizing a long-standing 
occupation), and Northern Ireland in 1921, 1922, and 1949. Britain thus 
has always contained a certain intrinsic tension that has had the poten-
tial to be productive as well as undermining.5 It should therefore come 
as no surprise to learn that “the empirical view of Britishness is open 
to objection,” for Britain’s “nested” nations have always retained and 
cultivated—rather than erased—distinguishing languages, churches, 
systems of law, jurisdiction over education and local governance, and 
“
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other features of civil society.6 To some extent, it is precisely these issues 
that are now reflected in forms of regional citizenship, and rearticu-
lated in current debates on these nations’ territorial governance in a 
manner that goes beyond issues of constitutional devolution per se.7 
Questions of national identity in Britain—such as who is British and 
what Britishness consists of—are therefore complicated by the fact that 
English and British have long been “(con)fused—[with] the coterminos-
ity of flag, anthem, symbols compounding the confusion.”8 Although 
as yet “English nationalism is the dog that did not bark,” the same is 
not true for England’s Scottish, Welsh, and Northern Irish neighbors.9 
In each case, nationalist and regionalist parties have recently assumed 
power at the regional level, either outright or in a minority or coalition 
government.10
The second implication in Gamble and Wright’s statement about the 
decline of British identity is at first less obvious but no less important. 
It concerns how current debates about Britishness are not restricted to 
national minorities but have also come to focus on ethnic minorities, 
namely migrant and post-immigrant minorities, frequently thought of as 
visible minorities. For example, one salient articulation of contemporary 
British national identity in governmental policy and discourse, frequently 
discussed in the press, is concerned with the promotion of common civic 
values, as well as English language competencies among ethnic minori-
ties through a wider knowledge of—and self-identification with—British 
cultural, historical, and institutional heritages, as well as approved kinds 
of political engagement and activity.11 A sort of British civic national iden-
tity, as the Commission on the Future of Multi-Ethnic Britain (CMEB) 
described, remains embedded in particular cultural values and traditions 
that involve not only an allegiance to the state, but also intuitive, emo-
tional, symbolic allegiances to a historic nation, even while the idea of the 
nation is contested and reimagined.12
Two Minorities or One Majority
Although this chapter is principally concerned with the place of Muslims 
in British nationhood, some elaboration of the ongoing debates about 
British nationhood is required to properly understand the place of 
Muslims within these debates. To be sure, Muslims have not created the 
wider debate.13 On the contrary, they have found themselves positioned 
between two impulses. One is a centrifugal multinationalism—such as 
Welsh devolution, Northern Ireland power sharing, or the prospect of 
Scottish independence—and the other centripetal—such as the civic 
integration of newer ethnic minorities. These need not pull in opposite 
directions, insofar as “Britain’s past and present immigrant minorities 
easily fit into this [common] framework.”14 By common framework, 
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we might think about a consensus that multiple identities are valu-
able and not in themselves a problem for identifying with Britain. As 
Bhikhu Parekh argues, “Just as it [Britain] has learned to respect the 
diversity of its four nations, it should respect the diversity of its immi-
grants.”15 This prospect has important conditions that can hinder or 
facilitate a meaningful settlement in which minorities feel that they 
belong and their status as British is not constantly challenged or ques-
tioned. Parekh continues:
The way a country treats its members plays a particularly important role. 
They are more likely to identify with the country if they are accepted as its 
full and legitimate members and treated with respect, enjoy equality with 
the rest, are free to express their other cherished identities, and have the 
opportunity to lead a minimally decent life. Conversely, they are unlikely 
to feel at home in the country and see it as theirs if their very presence is 
resented, if they are subjected to discriminatory treatment, mocked and 
ridiculed with impunity, or if they are required to sacrifice their other iden-
tities as a precondition of their membership or as proof of their commit-
ment to the country.16
Applying this observation to the question of where Muslims fit into 
contemporary debates about nationhood in Britain brings out that 
national identities usually reflect the culture of the majority.17 One nor-
mative option is to remake the nation (and national identities) in plu-
ral forms, something that needs to register what Michael Billig describes 
as the “banal” features of ordinary nationhood that may not commonly 
be understood to be inscribed with majority ethnic, cultural or racial fea-
tures.18 It was this very assessment of British national identity that, at the 
turn into the twenty-first century, informed the CMEB, a nongovernmen-
tal inquiry created by an influential equality think-tank and charity, the 
Runnymede Trust. This inquiry characterized British national identity 
as potentially “based on generalisations [that] involve a selective and 
simplified account of a complex history” in which “many complicated 
strands are reduced to a simple tale of essential and enduring national 
unity.”19 Because they do not easily fit into a majoritarian account of 
national identity or cannot be reduced to or assimilated into a prescribed 
public culture, minority differences thus may be negatively conceived.
Britain has faced particular challenges in addressing issues of dis-
advantage tied to cultural difference experienced by a variety of ethnic 
and religious minorities. The most substantive response, developed 
cumulatively during the final quarter of the twentieth century and made 
up of a range of policies and discourses, is commonly known as multicul-
turalism. The multicultural response has sought to promote equality of 
access to opportunities and accommodate aspects of minority difference 
while promoting the social and moral benefits of ethnic minority-related 
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diversity in an inclusive sense of civic belonging. This has been neither 
a linear nor stable development, has frequently been subject to (often 
productive) criticism from a variety of camps, and has especially been 
under stress since the publication of the CMEB report.20 More than a 
decade since then, a period that has included civil disturbances, wars 
abroad, and terrorism at home, as well as the distinctively multicultural 
London 2012 Olympics, the core idea that Britain rejects the idea of 
integration—being based on a drive for unity through uncompromising 
cultural assimilation—remains as true as ever.
This is not to say that competing discourses and policies do not have 
significant traction, but the resilience and dynamism of Roy Jenkins’s 
famous 1966 definition of integration in Britain—as “not a flattening pro-
cess of assimilation but equal opportunity accompanied by cultural diver-
sity in an atmosphere of mutual tolerance”—is clearly evident to those 
who choose to look. That is not to deny this has been qualified. Hence 
the Nationality, Immigration and Asylum Act of 2002 explicitly intro-
duced a test, implemented in 2005, for those seeking British citizenship. 
Thus applicants should show “a sufficient knowledge of English, Welsh 
or Scottish Gaelic” and “a sufficient knowledge about life in the United 
Kingdom.”21 Immigrants seeking to settle in the United Kingdom (apply-
ing for “indefinite leave to remain”) also have to pass the test, which latter 
stipulation has been effective since April 2007. If applicants do not have 
sufficient knowledge of English, they are encouraged to attend English 
for Speakers of Other Languages (ESOL) and citizenship classes. Despite 
important variations, emphasis and explicitness on national identities is 
thus renewed in countries that have not always prioritized it—such as 
Britain, Denmark, and increasingly Germany. This phenomenon is not 
simply a methodological artifact whose true meaning is obscured by 
methodological nationalism.
In contrast, postmigrant groups have been recognized as ethnic and 
racial minorities requiring state support and differential treatment to 
overcome distinctive barriers in their exercise of citizenship. This recog-
nition includes how, under the remit of several race relations acts (RRAs), 
the state has sought to integrate minorities into the labor market and 
other key arenas of British society by promoting equal access. It is nearly 
forty years since the introduction of a third RRA in 1976 cemented a state 
sponsorship of race equality by consolidating earlier, weaker legislative 
instruments, those in 1965 and 1968. Alongside its broad remit span-
ning public and private institutions, recognizing indirect discrimination, 
and imposing a statutory public duty to promote good race relations, the 
1976 RRA created the Commission for Racial Equality (later amalgamated 
into the Equality and Human Rights Commission) to assist individual 
complainants and monitor implementation of the act. Does this amount 
to multiculturalism? We argue that it does, though lacking any official 
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multicultural act or charter, in having rejected the idea of integration 
more than forty years ago.
“Framing” Muslims
According to the most recent census of England and Wales, around 
2.7 million people (or 4.8 percent of the population) define themselves 
as Muslim—making Muslims the second largest religious group after 
Christians (33.2 million, or 59.3 percent).22 As the Office for National 
Statistics summarizes, the areas with the highest proportion of Muslims 
are in London, especially Tower Hamlets and Newham, respectively 
34.5 percent and 32.0 percent, and Redbridge and Waltham Forest, both 
higher than 20 percent.23 Beyond London, areas more than 20 percent 
Muslim include Blackburn with Darwen in the northwest (27 per-
cent), as well as Bradford in Yorkshire and the Humber, Luton in the 
east of England, Slough in the southeast, and Birmingham in the West 
Midlands. The precise cross-tabulations of ethnic composition are yet 
to be released, but it is anticipated that they will not show a radical 
departure from the configuration of ethnic proportions set out in the 
last census.24 In 2001, those of Pakistani origin made up 42.5 percent 
of the Muslim population; Bangladeshis, 16.8 percent; Indians, 8.5 per-
cent; and most interestingly “other white,” 7.5 percent. This “other white” 
category includes those of Turkish, Arabic, and North African origin who 
did not define themselves as nonwhite; East European Muslims from 
Bosnia and Kosovo; and white Muslims from across Europe. Finally, 
6.2 percent of the Muslim population identified as black African, 5.8 per-
cent as other Asian, and 4.1 percent as British. Even with this heteroge-
neity, it is still understandable that Muslims in Britain are associated 
primarily with South Asia, especially given that they make up roughly 
68 percent of the British Muslim population.
Although a small proportion of the total population of England and 
Wales, Muslims are the minority group whose national loyalty and inte-
gration has been of greatest concern.25 This may partly be due to anxieties 
following the attacks of 9/11 in New York and 7/7 in London, though 
fear throughout the West of Muslims and questions about their loyalty 
predate the war on terror.26 Muslim identities have thus become a staple 
feature of contemporary political discussion in Britain. It is the content 
of these familiar discussions, however, which some have argued “oper-
ates as the other half of a distorted dialogue,” that is of concern.27 Despite 
fears of British Muslims’ loyalty, available evidence suggests that most 
Muslims do identify with Britain and feel British. Using the 2005 Home 
Office Citizenship Survey, Anthony Heath and Jane Roberts show that 
43 percent of Muslim respondents identify very strongly with Britain and 
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42 percent fairly strongly.28 These figures are corroborated by earlier sur-
vey data, and later surveys even suggest that British Muslims identify 
more strongly with Britain than the British public at large.29 Polling data 
from Max Wind-Cowie and Trevor Gregory support this further:
Our polling shows that 88 percent of Anglicans and Jews agreed that 
they were “proud to be a British citizen” alongside 84 percent of non-
conformists and 83 percent of Muslims—compared with 79 percent for the 
population as a whole. . . . This optimism in British Muslims is significant  
as—combined with their high score for pride in British—it runs counter 
to a prevailing narrative about Muslim dissatisfaction with and in the UK. 
While it is true that there are significant challenges to integration for some 
in the British Muslim community—and justified concern at the levels of 
radicalism and extremism in some British Muslim communities—overall 
British Muslims are more likely to be both patriotic and optimistic about 
Britain than are the white British community.30
Despite this evidence, leading politicians often conceive of and por-
tray Muslims as having difficulty feeling British and seeing their British 
identities as meaningful parts of their individual identities. Likewise, 
many leading journalists portray some Muslims as having difficulty 
“being British” and behaving as British people are “supposed” to behave. 
These portrayals have significant consequences. Politicians, the publicly 
funded education system, the media, and the arts help shape the broader 
public subjective sense of national identity issues.31 Similarly, journalists 
who write for national newspapers convey information about, as well as 
an image of, the nation that readers often internalize, thus influencing 
the way they think about their own and others’ identification with the 
nation.32 If senior politicians and journalists suggest that some Muslims 
have difficulty feeling and being British, it is unsurprising if Muslims are 
seen as outsiders by large sections of the public in Britain. The discourse 
about Muslims by important public figures, in short, contributes to and 
reinforces a sense among many in Britain that Muslims, or at least a good 
many Muslims, do not belong.
Feeling British
How do senior Labour and Conservative party politicians conceptual-
ize and portray the ability of Muslims to feel British?33 We can begin to 
get a glimpse of their views through interviews conducted in 2007 and 
2008 with six members of the Labour government—Labour was in power 
between 1997 and 2010—and four members of the shadow Conservative 
cabinet, as well as published reports of their speeches and comments. 
All the politicians interviewed had some responsibility for the policy 
area of community cohesion, which since its introduction in 2001 as a 
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government focus, has been intimately tied to issues relating to Muslims 
and Britishness.34 Indeed, this policy area was initially created to help pre-
vent disturbances like those in 2001 in Oldham, Burnley, and Bradford, 
in which young Muslims participated, often provoked by the far-right 
British National Party. It also developed in response to reports on the 
disturbances that recommended a national debate on “the common ele-
ments of nationhood.”35 The reports seemed to suggest that Muslims who 
participated in the riots had difficulty seeing themselves as British, a view 
supported by the then home secretary, David Blunkett, who praised the 
reports for facing “head on” how “people in the Asian community help 
the second and third generation feel British.”36
Certain junior ministers, such as Angela Eagle, responsible for commu-
nity cohesion policies were sanguine about the ability of Muslims to feel 
British. Hence Eagle, when interviewed, said that “having a British iden-
tity isn’t inconsistent with being a British Pakistani.”37 Mike O’Brien, a 
minister of state for pension reform in 2007 and 2008 and for race equality 
from 1999 to 2001, said that “a lot of Muslims actually do” feel British and 
that they are unlikely to have difficulty doing so because “a person can feel 
dual identity, you can be British and you can feel Pakistani . . . that’s not a 
problem.”38 Fiona Mactaggart, MP, suggested that even Muslims who say 
they do not feel British may not really be rejecting their British identities: 
“If the British government has done something you think is wrong, like 
going to war with Iraq, then you can say I’m no longer British . . . that’s 
a way of rejecting their values. . . . But I’m not sure how profound it is.”39 
These Labour Party ministers contested the view that Muslims had dif-
ficulty feeling British, unlike their senior colleague and cabinet minister 
David Blunkett. To be sure, Blunkett claimed, “you can be first generation 
Pakistani and British.” But when asked which immigrant groups might 
have difficulty feeling British, he indicated that among some Pakistanis, 
“I think there’s a lip service to Britishness and the issue is if we get under 
the surface, do people really mean it, do they feel it?” He added, “You 
see, Pakistani covers a lot of different backgrounds, Pashtun and all the 
rest of it, and so it’s difficult and they don’t always agree with each other. 
So I always have to find out who the community leaders are [laughs]. . . . 
I think they would, I think all those groups would pay a lip service to 
being British.”40
Unsure about whether many Pakistanis pay lip service to Britishness, 
Blunkett stated, “I don’t have any authentic statistics on it, I don’t have 
anything that is not just pure anecdote.”41 Indeed, Blunkett was the home 
secretary who set up the Home Office Citizenship Survey mentioned ear-
lier, in which more than four-fifths of Muslim respondents claimed that 
they very strongly or fairly strongly belonged to Britain.42 In establishing 
the survey, Blunkett reflected the turn toward “evidence-based policy” 
and the prevailing “mood” in government in support of “management 
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by numbers.”43 It is thus difficult to understand why, despite requesting 
data relating to Muslims and despite a mood in government that favored 
using it, Blunkett relied on anecdotal information. One possible reason 
is his view that survey data on Muslim attitudes to feeling British reflect 
the “lip service” Blunkett believes some are willing to pay to Britishness.44
Blunkett also linked views about feeling British to social class. Some 
Pakistani and Bangladeshi Muslims, he indicated, have difficulty feeling 
British because they are “at the very bottom of the economic ladder.” He 
saw a relationship between feeling British, integration, and being eco-
nomically successful:
The Hindu community have managed not to be the focal point of bitterness 
and hatred . . . because there’s a very much larger middle class, and wher-
ever you have a larger middle class . . . then integration, social cohesion go 
hand in hand. . . . And therefore the answer to your question is those areas 
of inward migration, where people have been struggling at the very bottom 
end of the economic ladder, that obviously means Bangladeshi and to some 
extent Pakistani communities, although that is changing.45
In a lecture delivered in 2003, Blunkett spoke of a growing number of 
young Muslims who believe they have to choose between identifying as 
Muslim or British. Other leading politicians have made similar claims. 
As Blunkett said, “There will always be those . . . encouraging their fol-
lowers to define their faith and their identity in opposition to outsiders 
rather than in positive terms. . . . It is a worrying trend that young second 
generation British Muslims are more likely than their parents to feel they 
have to choose between feeling part of the UK and feeling part of their 
faith.”46 In a Fabian pamphlet written when Ruth Kelly was secretary of 
state for local government and communities and Liam Byrne was minis-
ter of state for immigration, Byrne and Kelly expressed similar concerns 
about Muslims’ identity: “There is a particular issue with a minority of 
second and third generation Muslims’ ability to feel British.”47
Like the views of many politicians, Blunkett’s were often inconsistent 
and contradictory. He noted in a 2001 newspaper interview that after 
September 11 he thought that
there was a real problem in trying to hook the Islamic community and do 
something about them feeling part of the country. . . . We needed to throw 
up a protective screen and we needed at the same time to hold out a hand 
to say, you know, you are part of us. . . . It’s a self-fulfilling prophecy, if you 
say to people . . . we think you are very different, we think that there is a 
problem here and . . . and we’re extremely concerned that you do some-
thing about it, then that re-enforces a feeling. Whereas if you embrace peo-
ple, we’ve all done this in our own lives, if you embrace somebody who is 
giving you a hard time, then it’s much more difficult.48
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One strategy for Blunkett was to embrace Muslims and help them 
“to feel part of our community.”49 At the same time, however, as we 
have indicated, he emphasized that many Muslims lack a strong 
British identity, and, in the interview in 2001, noted how some 
Muslims should avoid marrying people from their countries of origin 
and need to adhere to British norms.50 By Blunkett’s own admission, 
his approach was not only inconsistent with his and his government’s 
data sets and approach to using such data, but also with his ideas of 
how to make Muslims feel at home in Britain at a time when they felt 
threatened by the “atmosphere that . . . had been created by the attack 
in America.”51
Similar contradictions are found among leading Conservative Party 
politicians. On the one hand are indications that they accept that Muslim 
values are now part of British society, as when William Hague, then 
Conservative Party leader, in the week after the 2001 disturbances in 
Oldham, pointed to “the way in which Muslim values are being built 
into the edifice of Modern Britain.”52 Sayeeda Warsi, as opposition 
spokeswoman on community cohesion, and after a trip to Sudan to aid 
the release of a British school teacher, made clear that being a Muslim 
does not conflict with British values: “I hope our mission to Sudan dem-
onstrated to people in Britain, and in other Western countries, that you 
can be Muslim and hold firm to your country’s values and interests.”53 
Former community cohesion spokesman Paul Goodman distinguished, 
in an interview, between older Muslim immigrants and the younger gen-
erations: “The very oldest tranche of the people . . . I don’t get the sense 
that when they arrived they wanted to engage with the mainstream cul-
ture.” But in successive generations, he believed, are those “who plunge 
themselves into the mainstream.”54
Other leading Conservatives conceived of and portrayed Muslims 
rather differently. When we asked the then shadow security minister 
Pauline Neville Jones, who in 2007 published a report on community 
cohesion, whether any particular “types of people” might have difficulty 
feeling British, she answered, “That’s a very good question, and a kind 
of important question, actually. What I’m about to say is not based on 
either work we’ve done or, or stuff I’ve read.”55 She went on to say that 
there could be “quite a lot of people who don’t feel particularly British” 
and that thus the focus should not be exclusively on Muslims. However, 
when asked whether some Muslims might have difficulty feeling British, 
she responded, “yep.”56 Elsewhere she has been quoted as saying that the 
challenge “is not how you try to indigenise Islam . . . which is important, 
but how you give British Muslims in this country the feeling that actually 
they are Brits, like any other British [sic].”57 Former community cohe-
sion spokesman and later attorney general, Dominic Grieve, shared such 
views. He seemed unaware of studies concerning British identity while 
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saying, in our interview, that non-Muslims might have difficulty feeling 
British, and suggesting that Muslims might have trouble both being and 
feeling British and hold views that are out of sync with British norms and 
traditions:
If looked at bluntly, I keep on meeting very pleasant people, not just Muslims, 
sometimes from other religious groups but I have to say principally Muslims, 
who seem to me to have views, and I have listened carefully to what they’ve 
got to say, which are certainly incompatible with development in our national 
and historical tradition.
It is true there are only a tiny number of people who want to blow them-
selves up on the underground killing people for the sake of their view of 
what the world should be like. But equally it seems to me that whilst there 
are large numbers of Muslims living in Britain who have very little dif-
ficulty reconciling their religious views with the advantages of living in a 
pluralist democratic society, there are actually quite a large number of them 
who, whilst they might be quite grateful for the fact that they are living in a 
pluralist society rather than being persecuted somewhere else, actually want 
to live in a society that is very different.58
Thus, although “large numbers” of peaceful Muslims are glad to live 
in Britain and benefit from doing so, he says, they allegedly wish Britain 
to be a very different society and this prevents them from identifying 
with it. Interestingly, Neville Jones offered a more critical view of British 
society that might explain why Muslims are loathe to identify with it. She 
referred to “aspects of modern western British secular society [that] are 
particularly unattractive. The violence, the lawlessness, the drunkenness, 
the, um, the vulgarity, these are all things that no sane person would actu-
ally want to join.”59
Being British
Leading journalists also have made problematic links between Muslims 
and Britishness, but in a different way from the politicians we have 
discussed. The newspaper coverage following former home and foreign 
secretary Jack Straw’s controversial comments in 2006 about Muslim 
women who choose to wear the niqab (a full-face veil) is a case in point.60 
In his weekly column in the Lancashire Telegraph, Straw explained the rea-
sons why he asked Muslim women wearing the niqab to remove the veil 
when meeting him in his Blackburn constituency office.61 The removal 
of the face veil, he argued, enabled him to engage more effectively in a 
face-to-face dialogue. He was better able to “see what the other person 
means and not just hear what they say.” He described face veils as a “vis-
ible statement of separation and difference” that made “better, positive 
relations between the two communities more difficult.”62 He continued:
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It was not the first time I had conducted an interview with someone in 
a full veil, but this particular encounter, though very polite and respect-
ful on both sides, got me thinking. In part, this was because of the appar-
ent incongruity between the signals which indicate common bonds—the 
entirely English accent, the couple’s education (wholly in the UK)—and the 
fact of the veil. Above all, it was because I felt uncomfortable about talking 
to someone “face-to-face” who I could not see.63
Much later, and as the 2010 general election neared, Straw apologized 
for the problems that his views caused Muslims, but in his memoirs he 
subtly changed positions again by noting how glad he was that he raised 
the issue.64 The notion that Muslims wearing the veil are antithetical to 
British traditions is implied in Straw’s claims that his views reflect in part 
“the concern of other white people.”65
Straw’s comments seemed have encouraged and given legitimacy to jour-
nalists to portray some Muslims as unable to be British.66 Characteristic 
of much of the newspaper coverage, and from all impressions, the 
national popular reaction saw the issue of the niqab—which was univer-
sally agreed to be worn by only a tiny percentage of Muslim women— 
presented as a matter of national identity and minority-majority rela-
tions rather than a rather marginal issue of personal religious choice. 
Consider the most widely read middle-market national newspaper, the 
Daily Mail, a publication widely recognized for focusing its coverage on 
controversial matters of ethnic minority difference. The Daily Mail’s edi-
torials frequently framed their discussion by juxtaposing British national 
identity with Muslim separatism (facilitated by multiculturalism). The 
following extract from such an editorial provides a good illustration of 
how Muslims and national identity were often cast as mutually exclusive 
in that newspaper:
This Government has actively promoted multiculturalism, encouraged 
Muslim “ghettoes” and set its face against greater integration. Anyone who 
dared to question this new apartheid was routinely denounced as a “rac-
ist.” Britishness? Who cares? For New Labour yes, including Mr Straw, it 
became an article of faith for the ethnic minorities to celebrate their own 
languages, culture and traditions, at the expense of shared values. There 
could hardly be a more effective recipe for division. Is it really surpris-
ing . . . if they [Muslims] see Mr Straw’s views on the veil as a juddering 
reversal of all that has gone before?67
Several important ideas intermingle in this passage, but clearly 
Britishness is portrayed as the opposite to a government-sponsored 
multiculturalism that encourages people to celebrate their differences. 
The latter has allegedly created a type of apartheid, especially among 
Muslims who were permitted, if not encouraged, to celebrate their 
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distinctive features under multiculturalism. Seen as a corollary of multi-
culturalism, Muslim difference is juxtaposed with, and seen as antitheti-
cal to, Britishness, which stands for shared values and integration. Like 
multiculturalism, then, Muslim difference is conceived as a competitor to 
Britishness, the latter also seen to be missing among Muslims—although 
a sense of Britishness is viewed as having the ability to rectify the prob-
lems that multiculturalism has allegedly fostered, including “Muslim 
ghettoes.”
Prominent columnists in the Daily Mail expressed similar views. For 
example, Alison Pearson articulated how she and other women feel a sense 
of ownership of Britain that is disturbed by women wearing the niqab:
It’s not a nice sensation—to feel judged for wearing your own clothes in 
your own country. The truth is that females who cover their faces and bod-
ies make us uneasy. The veil is often downright intimidating. . . . I just don’t 
like seeing them on British streets. Nor do I want to see another newspaper 
provide, as it did this week, a cut-out-and-keep fashion guide to the dif-
ferent types of veil: “Here we see Mumtaz, or rather we don’t see Mumtaz 
because the poor kid is wearing a nosebag over her face, modelling the lat-
est female-inhibiting shrouds from the House of Taliban.”68
More is at work here than national identity. There are clear intersec-
tions with gender and the discourse on female submission that under-
girds the contested nature of what veiling signifies.69 For Pearson, the 
“country” belongs to women who are willing not to cover their faces and 
who have a “liberal” conception of modest dress. Those who wear veils 
are in some sense aliens, even if they are also British citizens. Their stan-
dards of prescribed modesty are not simply regarded as extreme but as 
un-British, making other women uneasy and self-conscious in “their own 
country.” The “British streets,” as Pearson puts it, are no place for those 
wearing a garment from the “House of Taliban.”
Perhaps surprisingly, some journalists at the Daily Telegraph, a 
conservative-leaning newspaper, adopted a far more nuanced position 
with regards to the niqab. Charles Moore, columnist in and former editor 
of the newspaper, did not endorse the idea of the veil as a symbol of 
oppression. Indeed, he noted how discussions about it among Muslims in 
Britain can at times signify autonomy.70 Moore not only noted “a struggle 
for control of Islam in this country, and for its political exploitation,” but 
that wearing the niqab can simply be a form of rebellion among teenage 
girls against oppression they experience from their parents: “There is an 
attempt to ‘arabise’ Muslims from the Indian sub-continent, persuading 
them to wear clothes that are alien to their culture to show their religious 
zeal. . . . For a few Muslim girls in this country, wearing the veil is a form of 
oppression imposed by their families; for more, it is a form of teenage rebellion, of 
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showing more commitment than their parents—a religious version of wearing 
a hoodie.”71
Moore wrote that “many non-Muslims find these veils a little unset-
tling . . . not because they are an exotic import to these shores . . . but 
because they conceal the face.” Nonetheless, Moore noted that setting 
up British national traditions and wearing “the veil” as opposed to each 
other is “a hostile statement about the society in which the wearer lives,” 
and wrongly portrays Muslims who wear the niqab as being hostile to 
Britain and unwilling to behave like other British people.72
But what about more difference-friendly newspapers like the Independent? 
The Independent has a reputation for balanced discussion and is less likely 
to cast British national identity and examples of Muslim difference as 
mutually exclusive. Indeed, one editorial, titled “Mr Straw has raised a 
valid issue, but reached the wrong conclusion,” maintained that “it [the 
niqab] is not the wearing of the headscarf. . . . Unlike in France, where the 
wearing of headscarves at school became a highly contentious political 
issue, the attitude to headscarves in Britain has been wisely liberal, which 
has kept the subject largely out of the political domain.”73 Another edito-
rial went as far as to contrast what it characterized as negative contem-
porary press coverage of Muslims with that experienced by other groups 
in earlier periods: “The shameful aspect is that we are repeating our mis-
takes, in standing by while certain ethnic or religious minorities—in this 
case, Muslims—are demonised. Britain may be seen abroad as having 
managed the transition to a multicultural society more successfully than 
some, but as a nation we have not overcome the tendency to suspect, even 
fear, ‘the other.’ ”74
Still, the Independent’s editorials and main stories are particularly strik-
ing when contrasted with the ways its leading columnists use national 
identity to condemn those who wear the niqab and sometimes also the 
hijab.75 This includes, most notably, Yasmin Alibhai-Brown, one of only 
two or three Muslim columnists in the national press, who has portrayed 
wearers of the niqab not only as deliberately rejecting British, or at the 
least, Western society, but also as acting and dressing as aliens and abus-
ing their freedoms by trying to make Britain more like Saudi Arabia: 
“When does this country decide that it does not want citizens using their 
freedoms to build a satellite Saudi Arabia here? . . . It [the niqab] rejects 
human commonalities and even the membership of society itself. . . . It is 
hard to be a Muslim today. And it becomes harder still when some choose 
deliberately to act and dress as aliens.”76
The view that being Muslim and British can, at times, conflict is also 
nicely illustrated by the Sunday Telegraph columnist Patience Wheatcroft, 
who characterized the niqab as “a barrier that limits the creation of rela-
tionships. It unites those who nestle behind such garments and makes it 
harder for them to integrate. . . . It may be that there are many Muslims 
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who choose to wear the veil but also want to play a full role in British soci-
ety. They should realise that they are making that more difficult because 
of the uniform they choose to wear.”77
In sum, journalists working at newspapers that are traditionally 
thought to span the political spectrum are portraying some Muslims as 
having difficulty being British.
Conclusions
We have shown that some politicians are expounding the view that Muslims 
do not feel British, even though since the 1990s the relevant surveys sug-
gest just the opposite; clearly a number of leading politicians conceive 
of and are promoting an inaccurate view about British Muslims. Also 
significant are the rationales for the politicians’ stated views. Blunkett’s 
reasons were economic. Although we certainly do not want to deny that 
poverty may cultivate a sense of exclusion, poverty is also experienced by 
certain white communities, but they are not typically thought to have dif-
ficulty feeling British. For several other leading politicians quoted here, 
some Muslims have difficulty feeling British because they want Britain 
to be a more Islamic land and they have difficulty leaving their own com-
munities. These are empirical claims that have yet to be investigated, but 
given the high percentage of Muslims who feel British, these claims, even 
if true, can apply to only a very small percentage of Muslims.
An understanding of what it means to be British is also being pro-
jected by senior journalists, and it does not include all Muslims. Focus 
on the tiny number of Muslims wearing the niqab has been considerable, 
the Jack Straw incident acting as a lightening rod for hostility against 
Muslims. The incident was seized on as an opportunity to lambaste not 
just conservative Islam, especially in its gender relations aspect, but multi-
culturalism as well. A marginal issue of dress obsessed the nation and its 
media for more than a week in 2006. The outpouring of emotional repul-
sion was massive against the niqab as un-British in a way that threatened 
the acceptance of other Muslims not wearing the niqab but visibly devout 
in various ways.
This flood of negative feeling about the niqab in particular and Islam 
more generally, bursting through usual restraints about public discourse, 
illustrates an important feature of nationhood. For such exclusionary, 
affective power, no less than imaginative inclusivity, is a central feature of 
national belonging. Indeed, we noted earlier that the CMEB outlined how 
such exclusive understandings of the nation can be inaccurate, reflecting 
a selective reading of British history and a privileging of the majority that 
is difficult to justify. More inclusive understandings of what it means to 
be British that do not interpret Muslim difference as a barrier are avail-
able. Indeed two of the authors of this chapter have separately suggested 
Nationhood and Muslims in Britain  183
the need to accept them.78 Doing so would entail a willingness among 
journalists to accept a more inclusive form of Britishness, which would 
provide a “space for Muslims” within the nation.79 Certainly when the 
CMEB suggested recasting the national story, the media’s reaction was 
hostile.80 But, significantly, and despite questions about both attachment 
to and ability to be a part of Britain, the vast majority of Muslims still feel 
British. Although we are right to be alert to the dangers of self-fulfilling 
prophecies, what is clear is that even if others cannot envisage a concep-
tion of the nation that includes Muslims, many Muslims can.
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